Meta-ethics Flashcards Preview

A Level - Ethics > Meta-ethics > Flashcards

Flashcards in Meta-ethics Deck (38)
Loading flashcards...
1
Q

division of meta

A
  • Cognitivism – moral value can be defined in terms of factual statements; moral judgements are truth claims
    o Ethical naturalism
    ♣ Moral value can be proven with natural facts e.g. Natural Law
    o Intuitionism
    ♣ Have an instinctual knowledge of what is good and bad
  • Non-Cognitivism – meaning of ethical words cannot be known, they express emotions, preferences or commands. Moral claims jump from is to ought: ‘you ought to clean your room’
    o Emotivism
    ♣ Moral value is an emotional reaction
    o Prescriptivism
    ♣ No meaning to ethical language, it is how we use it; we are prescribing an action
2
Q

cog and plato

A
  • Form of Good – the term good has many meanings
  • Good is a singular spiritual being, it has a greater reality than the objects of our perception
  • Good is a natural fact, but one that is outside of our everyday experience
3
Q

ethical naturalism summary

A
  • Moral judgements are true or false (moral realist view), and such judgements are reducible entirely to the concepts of natural science
  • Morals are objectively true, absolute facts of the natural world
4
Q

ethical naturalism people

A

bradley
aquinas
foot

5
Q

ethical naturalism - Bradley

A
  • F. H. Bradley (grew up in caste system in India – reflected in his emphasis on social place)
    o In his Ethical Studies, he critiques Util’s answer to the Q: why be moral?
    o Offers a psychological theory of moral maturation
    o We move from childish appetites and egoism to moral deliberation of seeing that our self-realisation is better achieved when we ‘have found our (…) function as an organ of the social organism’
    o ‘What (man) has to do depends on what his place is, what his function is, and that all comes from his station in the organism’ – i.e. must look at wider society to find good
    o Our duty is universal, concrete and objective; must find your place within society and fulfil your role/duty to create an ordered society (+Kant)
    o Goodness is defined in terms of a property in the natural world – developing of a mature self that seeks progress for the world around it
6
Q

ethical naturalism - aquinas

A
  • Aquinas (theological naturalist)
    o Aquinas links goodness to divine will and humans’ telos. These lead to a following of the 5 PPs, which are good
    o Wrongness/badness prevents someone from reaching eudaimonia as they are not in line with precepts
7
Q

ethical naturalism - foot summary

A

o Challenges Hume’s view that moral claims are derived from sentiment, deems moral evil as a natural defect (+Augustine)
o Moral good can be observed in the form of virtues pursued by individuals e.g. we can tell if someone is not trustworthy, there must be some absolute morality in order to recognise this
o These virtues aim at good (+ Aristotle)
o Virtues and following of these virtues can be observed and therefore good can be observed

8
Q

ethical naturalism - foot and nature

A

o Foot draws upon the order in the natural world
♣ There is a life cycle of self-maintenance and reproduction
♣ These can be achieved differently in each species
♣ Certain norms can be deduced e.g. night vision of the owl
♣ By applying these norms to individual members of the species, members can be judged to be effective/defective
♣ Same thing to say a living thing has good roots and that a human has good dispositions of will
o Gives example of oak roots; need strong roots to stay upright, there is something wrong with them if they do not have these

9
Q

general postives of ethical naturalism

A
  • Moral virtues like justice and truthfulness are too serious to be reduced to a matter of taste and opinion. Naturalism’s moral objectivism allows for moral claims to be discussed rationally.
    Believing moral claims are nothing but opinions means there are never any objective values or truths = anarchy. Naturalism provides a basis for human rights.
10
Q

general negatives of ethical naturalism

A
  • Nature can be misunderstood, could potentially justify evil things e.g. evidential problem of evil
  • If nature is fallen (Augustine), how can you advocate morality based on a nature that is inclined towards sin?
  • Absolutist nature leaves no room for moral dispute
11
Q

ethical naturalism criticism - Hume and foot response

A
  • David Hume
    o Moral claims are derived from sentiment, not reason; reason is impotent in matters of morality
    o Writers on morality move from is statements to ought statements – naturalistic fallacy
    o Philippa Foot
    ♣ Challenges Hume, views moral evil as a natural defect (+Augustine)
    ♣ Moral good can be observed in the form of virtues pursued by individuals e.g. we can tell if someone is not trustworthy, there must be some absolute morality in order to recognise this
    ♣ These virtues aim at good (+ Aristotle)
    ♣ Virtues and following of these virtues can be observed and therefore good can be observed
12
Q

ethical naturalism criticism - pidgen

A
  • Charles R. Pigden
    ‘Naturalists, in short, resort to all sorts of supposed facts – sociological, psychological, scientific even metaphysical or supernatural’ (Companion to Ethics)
13
Q

ethical naturalism criticism - Mackie

A
  • J. L. Mackie

o Sees value in naturalism, but moral rules are not absolute facts, but rather based on tradition

14
Q

ethical naturalism criticism - Moore

A
  • G. E. Moore
    o Puts forward naturalistic fallacy due to his open question technique
    ♣ E.g. of closed Q: I know that Stephen is your brother, but is he your sibling? This is a pointless and closed Q.
    ♣ E.g. of open Q: I know Stephen is your brother, but does he like maths? It is an open Q, second part indirectly links to first.
    Moore argues a statement such as ‘Hitler was evil’ is an open statement due to the word ‘evil’ being impossible to grasp through direct observation, as everyone would need to grasp evil in the same way as brother. To assume this would be to commit a ‘naturalistic fallacy’. Cannot define ethical judgements as factual.
15
Q

ethical non nat/intuitionism summary

A
  • Terms ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are objective but indefinable.
  • Basic moral truths are either self-evident or perceived similarly to how our sense experience the physical world
  • Moral knowledge is intuitively known, with the force of an ‘ought’ or duty to act
  • Intuition = special form of consciousness, allows us to access moral knowledge
  • We can do things to improve accuracy of our intuition (+ Aquinas, educating conscience)
    o E.g. seeking to be informed and consistent in our judgements
    o Consult intuition of others
    o Be aware of bias and self-interest
    o Be aware that complex cases may have different features and competing considerations, cannot reduce morality to narrow principles
16
Q

intuitionism - Moore general

A

o Agrees with Hume’s fact-value gap, accepting that one cannot move from a descriptive statement like, ‘torture causes physical and mental pain’ to a moral statement like ‘torture is wrong’ (cannot move from is to ought)
o Good is not directly observable, we need to rely on intuition.
o A person can see properties of moral goodness in an individual but cannot define it
♣ ‘If I am asked, “how is good to be defined?”, my answer is that it cannot be defined and that all is all I have to say about it’
♣ E.g. Mother Teresa was a good person. – this is not directly observable, but we can use our intuition to see properties of moral goodness in the person, although you cannot analyse that moral goodness. Any rational being will come to the same conclusion.

17
Q

intuitionism - Moore and facts

A

o He argues that intuitionism is cognitivism, individual has to weigh things up in their mind.
o Using facts and intuition, all reasonable people will come to same conclusion.
o Draws a parallel between the colour yellow and the word good – both are simple notions yet neither can be defined, they defy further analysis.
o We must analyse the facts of the case and then apply intuition so that course of action becomes obvious.

18
Q

intuitionism - prichard

A

o Develops work of Moore in article, Does Moral Philosophy rest upon a mistake
o Sees that some have more developed intuitions – thinking developed further
o Sees a difference between general thinking – ascertaining facts - moral thinking – pure intention
o When conflict arises we settle them by intuiting our primary duty to obligation in the situation. Gather facts and then use intuition to decide
o E.g. abortion – who is duty towards? Will have to weigh up moral obligation to the unborn child and the moral obligation to the mother and decide which obligation is greatest. Different levels of enlightenment mean there will be differing opinions.

19
Q

intuitionism people

A

moore
prichard
ross

20
Q

intuitionism - ross, right vs. good

A

o Viewed the term ‘right’ as as difficult to define than the word ‘good’
♣ Defined right as ‘suitable, in a unique and indefinable way, which we may express by the phrase ‘orally suitable’ to the situation in which the individual finds himself’
♣ When we face a moral decision, right is ‘an act which the agent thinks is right in the situation as the agent thinks it is’
♣ Right and wrong are the action determined and goodness relates to the motives and intentions behind the action e.g. it might be right to help an old lady cross the road, but it is not good if the intention is to gain praise (+Aquinas, interior/exterior acts and Aristotle, intention)

21
Q

intuitionism - ross moral truths

A

o There are real objective moral truths that are as fundamental to the universe as maths (cognitivist)
o Moral intuitions do not sort out every moral situation, but uncover basic moral truths whilst guiding and motivating our moral judgements
o 7 Self-evident (prima facie) duties/principles
♣ Promise keeping
♣ Reparation for harm done
♣ Gratitude
♣ Justice
♣ Beneficence
♣ Self-improvement
♣ Non-maleficence
o Where duties conflict, must use instinct to decide ‘actual duty’

22
Q

general positives of intuitionism

A
-	Situational
o	H, subjective
-	Allows for more control
o	H, dangerous
-	Morally realist, offers a sense of moral duty/motive. Motivation fits with intuition and everyday common sense.
23
Q

positives of intuitionism - libby ahluwalia

A
  • It avoids the issues of naturalism, especially the problems of definition exposed by the open question argument. (Libby Ahluwalia)
24
Q

positives of intuitionism - Russell

A
  • Bertrand Russell – not all a priori knowledge is mathematical and logical; thus, it can include moral language. Ethical language can be propositional and analytic.
25
Q

positives of intuitionism - kant

A
  • Kant would agree with Prichard’s emphasis on obligation – parallels duty.
26
Q

positives of intuitionism - aquinas and Aristotle

A

Aristotle and Aquinas would accord Ross’ emphasis on intention.

27
Q

general negatives of intuitionism

A
  • Relative, could lead to bad actions if conflicting principles
  • Not practical in terms of deciding moral rules
  • Diminished responsibility within legal system suggests some people are unable to use intuition
  • Psychopaths don’t seem to have moral intuition
  • Intuitionism is based solely on introspection, subjective
28
Q

intuitionism - criticisms of Moore

A

o Intuition assumes a faculty of mind different from ordinary perception. Moore claims we are able to recognise non-natural properties e.g. good but how are to know it is not a creation of our minds?
♣ Could argue against this by saying that this perception is a priori. Bertrand Russell – not all a priori knowledge is mathematical and logical.
o If we only know good by a process of intuition, how can we properly discuss our views and decide whose intuition is superior? Not helpful in moral disagreement
o If we cannot detect non-natural properties such as good, how is it recognisable? Ockham’s razor – intuitionism posits adding non-natural qualities to explain the good, simpler version than this is better.

29
Q

intuitionism - criticisms of ross

A

Criticism of Ross: how did he decide his list of prima facie duties?

30
Q

ethical non cog 2 strands and people

A

emotivism - ♣ Moral judgements are neither true or false, merely expressions of feelings of those who utter them (AYER)

prescriptivism - ♣ Ethical language is individuals’ attempt to get others to conform with their moral viewpoints, persuasive
(STEVENSON)

31
Q

emotivism - ayer influence and conc

A
  • Part of the Vienna Circle in 1920s who developed Logical Positivism
  • Wanted to look at ethical language from a more scientific perspective, out of logical positivism came emotivism
  • There can be no factual justification of rightness/wrongness, cannot be verified/falsified by empirical, factual information and thus are meaningless
  • They have no factual content, so there cannot be a genuine argument between people about what is ‘right’ in an ethical situation
32
Q

emotivism - ayer and different statements

A
  • He thought there were 3 types of judgements: logical (analytic, true by definition) judgements, factual (synthetic, verified empirically) judgements and moral judgements
  • Ayer views moral statements as non-propositional (cannot be deemed true/false and thus are meaningless e.g. I like cheese)
  • Logical Positivists challenged the previously held view that moral statements were cognitivist and propositional (analytic/synthetic – have a true/false response). They claimed moral statements are non-cognitivist and meaningless.
  • Moral statements simply reflect the individual’s emotion at that time
  • Rejected intuitionism as intuitions are unverifiable and meaningless (BUT…. Doesn’t help with moral disagreements)
33
Q

emotivism - boo hurrah

A
  • Moral judgements are internal – based on feeling
  • When you say something is good/bad, right/wrong, you express your reaction to it: either boo (dislike) or hurrah (like and approval)
  • For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement (…) I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments. (Ayer)
34
Q

prescriptivism - stevenson, persuasion

A
  • Tried to develop Ayer’s ideas as he recognised they don’t help with moral disagreements. Wanted to know how people use moral terms in everyday conversation.
  • He argued that moral judgements contain an element that expresses an attitude relative to a fundamental belief and an element that seeks to persuade
  • We ‘agree to disagree’ on matters of taste, but with morality, we seek to persuade others to share our opinion (more than emotivism, want to have an impact with our moral statements)
35
Q

prescriptivism - Stevenson and fact vs. emotion

A

• There is a distinction between factual beliefs and emotive attitudes. From the facts come emotive statements
• Disagreements can be settled with evidence, reintroduces cognitivist evidence
o E.g. Peter believes drives should wear seatbelts vs. should not wear seatbelts
o Both are emotivist statements and therefore both are right as they are saying what they believe to be right
o They discuss the facts: reports that wearing a seatbelt can save your life vs. more lives are saved by not wearing seatbelts as you can escape the car more easily
o Additional cognitivist evidence can win the debate and lead the other person to change their mind
• To Ayer, moral disagreements are arguments about preferences, to Stevenson they are about belief

36
Q

positives of ethical non-cog (emotivism/presc)

A
  • Avoids issue of defining good as it is deemed completely subjective and simply the emotions of the individual
  • Keeps morality simple, feelings are always correct
37
Q

negatives of ethical non-cog (emotivism/presc) - general

A
  • Feelings and morality are not always the same. You could feel a certain way but think it is wrong and so don’t do it
  • Ayer – reduces morality too far, need some concept of good/bad in society
  • Ayer – no help for moral disagreements
  • Emotivism fails to recognise cultural relativity when it comes to morality e.g. killing justified in some countries but deemed abhorrent in UK
38
Q

negatives of ethical non-cog (emotivism/presc) - Macintyre

A
  • Alasdair Macintyre
    o Questions ‘emotive meaning’, what gives moral utterances meaning is their importance to the people around them, thus not meaningless
    o Emotivists conflate meaning and use, they do not distinguish between the differing levels of importance moral statements hold
    o Stevenson’s view of the world is unpleasant, suggests people only want to persuade others of their views. It also fails to explain how moral views are formed in the first place
    o Emotivism does not help explaining how we can distinguish feelings and attitudes that are moral from other feelings and attitudes we may have