Moral hazard
GPs being incentivised to take too much risk due to performance fee
Hold up problems
Breakdowns in negotiations between two parties due to neither party wanting to concede
Blue chip managers
All prior funds in top quartile over last two business cycles
Established managers
Majority of funds in top quartile over last two business cycles
Re-emerging managers
Managers who have underperformed in recent years but have had top quartile funds in the past
Reactive deal sourcing
Checking 100s of proposals
Superior deal sourcing
Use industry contacts (ideally prior to them raising funds)
5 Issues of using past performance
ARSGA
Assumption when you scale up a σ by √N
Assumes zero autocorrelation.
Higher autocorrelation, higher long term vol
Six investment monitoring activities
3 benefits of monitoring
Two forms of active involvement inside fund’s governance
Three forms of active involvement outside the fund’s governance
Three ways monitoring can add value to existing investments
fund gatekeepers
intermediaries, such as investment consultants, researchers at banks, or family offices, who screen and select investment funds on behalf of institutional and high-net-worth clients
Bias blind spot
Tendency to underestimate your own biases
Failure and lessons from Amaranth collapse (HF) 2006
Over-concentration in natural gas futures calendar spread trade (long winter, short summer)
> Operated in OTC markets (low regulation) at huge volumes
Impact of prime brokers
Style drift (it began as a multi-strat)
Insufficient risk controls (e.g. leverage + limited oversight)
Failure and lessons from LTCM collapse (HF) 1998
RV credit fund. Employed significant leverage. Russian debt crises caused spreads to blow out, leading to big losses. Bailed out by 14 banks/HFs.
> Nobel prize economists can get it wrong
Large market positions through derivatives
Leverage and illiquidity can be lethal
Failure and lessons from Carlyle Capital Corp collapse (HF) 2008
Used short-dated loans to purchase long-term AAA agency mortgage bonds.
> MBS that are implicitly backed by the US govt, cannot be explicitly trusted
Failure and lessons from XIV collapse inverse vol ETN) 2018
Crowded short vol trade unwound (vol shot up). ETN fell by 95% in a day
> Importance of liquidity for structured products
ROE calculation with leverage
ROE = (ROAL) - (r(L-1))
Circuit breakers
Limiting trading activity if prices move too much too quickly
Failure and lessons from Bayou HF collapse 2005
Bayou was both an asset manager and broker. Allowed them to conceal losses for 8+ years.
> Some people are just fraudulent
Importance of independent auditors
Regulations are not a substitute for diligence
Affinity fraud
Targeting certain ethnic groups